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COMMENT AND CASE NOTES
THE POLL TAX AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
INVOLVED IN ITS REPEAL
HENRY N. WILUAmS*

The decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Biggs v. Beeler is the
climax to efforts to remove the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to
voting in Tennessee. The fight to eliminate this qualification for voting,
although raised on occasion for the past twenty-five years, actually became an issue in the 1938 gubernatorial election. Bills designed to abolish
* Member of the faculty, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, now in
the U.S. army.
1173 S.W. 2d 144 (July 3, 1943).
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the requirement of the payment of poll taxes for voting failed in the 1939
and 1941 legislatures. The legislature of 1943 repealed the statutory pro3
visions for poll taxes both as a tax2 and as a prerequisite for voting.
The case arose on complaint of "taxpayers, owners of real and personal
property," praying for an injunction restraining the execution of Chapter
384 and for a declaratory judgments on the constitutionality of both acts.
Various state and county officials were made defendants in the action.
The attorney general filed a demurrer on behalf of state officials averring
(i) that the acts were constitutional because the poll tax sections of the
state constitution were not self-executing, and (2) that the acts were not
defective on "technical" grounds. Polk County and its trustee adopted the
demurrer of the state officials as to Chapter 38, but charged that Chapter
37 was unconstitutional. A county election commissioner filed an answer
alleging that the payment of a poll tax as a qualification for voting is contrary to a republican form of government.6
The complainants attacked the validity of the acts upon a number of
grounds, the most important being that they violated Article II, Section
28, and Article IV, Section i, of the Tennessee constitution. The case
reached the supreme court on an appeal from the lower court's holding
2 Public Acts of x943, Chapter 37 repealing Sections 1082, I558, and 1559 of Williams Tennessee Code (1934).

3 Public Acts of I94, .Chapter 38 provided inter alia for the repeal of Sections 2027-2043,
2198, and 2202 of the Code and a portion of Section 2, Chapter 2, Public Acts of Second Extraordinary Session of 1937.
4 "An Act to prescribe certain qualifications for voters by providing for their permanent
registration and for the removal of the requirements for payment of the poll tax as a prerequisite to their voting in all general, special, primary, state, county and municipal elections; and
providing for the administration of this Act and prescribing punishments for violation of the
same .... ." and to repeal various sections of the Code.

5Declaratory judgments are provided for by Chapter 29, Public Acts of X923, sections
8835-8847, Williams Tennessee Code.
6 The chancellor ("Opinion of the Chancellor," Brief for Defendants and Appellants, Biggs
v. Beeler) overruled this contention on the authority of Pirtle v. Brown, u8 Fed. 2d 218, 139
A. L. R. 557 (I94I), cert. denied 314 U.S. 621. This case represented an unsuccessful attempt
to challenge the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting in Tennessee congressional elections. The
annotation in A. L. R. is useful.
7Art. II, sec. 28 provides in part: "All male citizens of this State over the age of twenty-one
years, except such persons as may be exempted by law on account of age or other infirmity,
shall be liable to a poll tax of not less than fifty cents nor more than one dollar per annum.
Nor shall any county or corporation levy a poll tax exceeding the amount levied by the State."
Art. IV, sec. i: "....
and there shall be no qualification attached to the right of suffrage,
except that each voter shall give to the judges of election, where he offers to vote, satisfactory
evidence that he has paid the poll taxes assessed igainst him for such preceding period as the
Legislature shall prescribe, and at such time as may be prescribed by law, without which his
vote cannot be received. And all male citizens of the State shall be subject to the payment of
poll taxes .......
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unconstitutional the repealing acts of the legislature of 1943. The supreme
court confined its attention to the constitutionality of Chapter 37.8
Although the Supreme Court of Tennessee is committed to a liberal interpretation of the Declaratory Judgments Law, 9 there seems to be some
question of the standing of the complainants to bring this suit under that
act or to challenge the constitutionality of the poll tax repeal statutes."
The court has held," that "To authorize a taxpayer to maintain a suit under the Declaratory Judgments Law, to determine the constitutionality
of a charter provision of a municipal government, he must have a 'real
interest' in the subject of the litigation, and this real interest is in no wise
different from that which he must have to enjoin a proposed municipal
action on the ground of illegality. 3 We see no ground for any distinction
in the interest which would authorize the one suit from the interest which
is necessary to the other." The most plausible explanation for passing on
the question is, perhaps, as Borchard has written 14 "State courts, when
they think the public issue important, are disposed to find a taxpayer's
interest, however trifling, as adequate to sustain the justiciability of the
action."
Aside from the Declaratory judgments Law, the standing of the complainants to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes is less easy to
explain. It is well settled that one not adversely affected by a statute cannot
challenge its validity. Even after adopting the policy that in a taxpayer's
action the total amount involved for all taxpayers rather than the individual's part is the amount at issue in the action's it is rather difficult to
understand how the possibility of increased taxation by some other statute
that might have followed the repeal of the poll tax statutes would create a
8 Chapter 38 provided (sec, 26) that it was enacted in anticipation of the repeal of Section
io82 of the Code, one of the sections repealed by Chapter 37.
9 "This Court is committed to a liberal interpretation of the Declaratory Judgments Act so
as to make it of real service to the people and the profession." Hodges v. Hamblen County,
152 Tenn. 395, 277 S. W. 901 (1925).
"0These matters were not discussed in the court's opinion.

11Perry v. City of Elizabethton, i6o Tenn.
2 Most municipal

102, 22 S. W. 2d 359 (1929).
charters in Tennessee are special or "private" acts of the legislature.

"3See Reams v. Board of Mayor and Aldermen of McMinnville, 155 Tenn. 222, 291 S. W.
which held: "The taxpayer may maintain the suit to restrain action by the municipal authorities only when they are acting illegally, and when the effect of their illegal action
will impose an additional burden of taxation."
1o67 (1927),

'4

Edwin M. Borchard, Declaratory judgments 36 (2d ed. 194).

ISSee Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U.S. 389 (i8gI).
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burden upon taxpayers or otherwise deprive them of a constitutional
right or privilege."6
The court made an attempt to create the impression that the statute
before it, Chapter 37, was solely a school revenue statute. This seems to be
completely answered by Justice Neil, in his dissenting opinion. He stated
that the legislature which repealed the poll tax had provided for the proper
maintenance of both elementary and high schools by appropriating $io,568,ooo for school purposes. He also denounced, "with all deference to
counsel," the argument that the Tennessee constitution contemplated
that poll taxes would be set aside as a "sacred fund" for school purposes.
This was a "pure fiction" because "it is a well known fact that there has
been no such fund in existence for more than fifty years."
Another question before the court was whether the provisions of Arti7
cle H, Section 28, and Article IV, Section i were directory or mandatory
and, if the latter, whether they were self-executing or non-self-executing.i'
The court held that the provisions of both sections were mandatory,
but non-self-executing., 9 Thereupon the court posed the decisive problem:
"When the legislature, in the execution of a trust conferred on it by the
constitution, has, by appropriate legislation, executed that trust and put

into operation and effect a constitutional mandate, may the legislature,
at a subsequent session, revoke and nullify that which it had [sic] done?"
(p. 146). Having been presented a problem without a direct precedent,
the court turned to "principle and reason" for guidance.
The court distinguished a mandatory non-self-executing provision from
a directory or permissive provision on the basis of the legislature's power
to enact legislation."° The couit at the same time expressed doubt as to
the power of the legislature to repeal statutes resting upon directory provisions;2 ' but it had no uncertainty as to the inability of the legislature to
16 Cf. dissenting opinions by Clief Justice Green and Justice Neil in Biggs v. Beeler, supra,
note I at pp. 148-150.
X7See ii Am. Jur. 686-688, 12 C. J. 740-741, 15 C. J. S. 120-24, 6 R. C. L. 55-57.

"8See ii Am. Jur. 688-697, 12 C. J. 729-39, i6 C. J. S. 98-12o, 6 R. C. L. 57-62.
i9 Biggs v..Beeler, supra, note i at 147.
20 In terms of effect, this appears to be more a distinction than difference. "The legislature
is left free to execute and act on .... [a directory provision], or not, at its pleasure .... but a
mandatory non-self-executing constitutional provision delegates to the legislature the execution of a power coupled with a command which, it is true, the legislature may disregard and
the courts are without authority to enforce performance of by affirmative decree" (p. 147).

21 The legislature ...... perhaps has the power to repeal and revoke its execution thereof
[directory provisions] by such action as it may from time to time elect to take ... ." (italics

supplied).
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repeal statutes founded on mandatory non-self-executing provisions.22
Characterizing such provisions as "'dormant and quiescent until some
statute brings them into life and operation,"' the court wrote:".. .. We
have here a case where a constitutional mandate, if originally 'dormant'
and 'inoperative,' has had vitality breathed into it, has been 'rendered
effective by supplemental legislation,' is now a live, active, operative thing
and to kill and destroy it requires affirmative action, which may be taken
only by its creator through constitutional amendment, or convention, not
by either the legislature or the courts. This constitutional mandate has
been so 'welded into intimate and permanent union' (Webster) with the
statute that the two have become one and indivisible, and the statute may
not now be divorced and destroyed. The necessary effect would be to
nullify and defeat operation of the constitutional mandate also. ' ' 23 Ac
cordingly, the court held that Chapter 37 was unconstitutional and that,
therefore, Chapter 38, by its own terms, became inoperative.
The dissenting opinions agreed with the opinion of the court that the
constitutional provisions in question were mandatory non-self-executing.
But both dissenting opinions held that the statutes under consideration
were valid, although Justice Neil implied that this was true only because
Article XI, Section 12 had in fact been complied with.24 Chief Justice
Green, who dissented, expressed his views succinctly: "Stripped of its
eloquence and ethics, the substance of the majority opinion is that obedience to a mandate of the constitution by one legislature introduces into
that instrument a warrant to this court to compel obedience to the mandate by a subsequent legislature. But the legislature cannot amend the
92 "But when the constitutional command has been carried into execution, and incorporated
into operative law, the courts, which may not say shall, have the authority and solemn obligation to say shall not."
23 The court indicated that the legislature could repeal the requirement that women pay
poll taxes, but held that in the absence of an indication of intention for the instant act to apply
to women it attempted to relieve all alike.
24 "If ....
the legislature finds sources of revenue for school purposes otherwise than from
poll taxes, as it has done, I think it may repeal the [poll] tax without doing violence to the
state constitution." Art. XI, Section 12 provides in part: "..... And the fund called the common school fund, and all the lands and proceeds thereof, dividends, stocks and other property
of every description whatever, heretofore by law appropriated by the General Assembly of this
State for the use of common schools, and all such as shall hereafter be appropriated, shall remain a perpetual fund, the principal of which shall never be diminished by Legislative appropriation; and the interest thereof shall be inviolably appropriated to the support and encouragement of common schools throughout the State, and for the equal benefit of all the
people thereof; and no law shall be made authorizing said fund, or any part thereof, to be diverted to any other use than the support and encouragement of common schools. The State
taxes derived hereafter from polls shall be appropriated to educational purposes, in such manner as the General Assembly shall, from time to time, direct by law ....
'?
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constitution nor can it bind future legislatures.' 5 justice Nel impliedly
agreed with the chief justice that the doctrine of the separation of powers 6
made the court powerless to restrain the legislature from repealing the
poll tax law.
The opinion of the court is far from satisfactory. The rule on the power
of a legislature to repeal acts of former legislatures has been stated: "As a
general principle, one legislature is competent to repeal or modify an act of
a former legislature, and one legislature cannot abridge the power of a
succeeding legislature ..... But this general principle has exceptions .....
These exceptions depend entirely on constitutional limitations of the
The cases cited by these authorities refer to conlegislative powers.
tracts that statutes created. The term "constitutional limitations" suggests prohibitions that may exist in a particular constitution that refer to
the legislative power. A mandatory non-self-executing provision would
hardly fall within this classification. The writer has been unable to locate
any other decision that purports to enlarge the restriction upon a legislature's power to repeal its former act to include mandatory non-self-executing provisions. Certainly the application of this innovation in policy
is likely to result in numerous difficulties.
The court's decision applied only to the poll tax as a source of revenue.
.Most proponents of poll tax repeal are, however, primarily interested in
the abolition of the poll tax as a qualification for voting. As a source of
revenue the poll tax is of minor importance.
It is perhaps idle to speculate on the Tennessee court's reaction to a
statute providing only for the repeal of statutory provisions for the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting.28 The constitutional pro-

visions for the poll tax as a source of revenue and as a prerequisite for
voting are in similar terms. The section of the constitution relating to
revenue is buttressed with another constitutional provision that poll
2sElsewhere in his opinion, Chief Justice Green by a reference to the provision that forbids
the impairment of the obligation of a contract qualified this last clause. The first clause of the
last-quoted sentence must, of course, be read in its proper context.
26Art.II, sec. 2 provides: "No person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall
exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein
directed or permitted."
2725 R. C. L. 162. Cf. "The power of the legislature to repeal a statute is subject to, and
only subject to, such limitations as are imposed by the constitution of the state and the United
States." 59 C. J. 899.
28Had Chapter 38 not been dependent upon Chapter 37, the court, following the reasoning
in the instant case, might well have held the elimination of the payment of the poll tax as a
requirement for voting in primary and municipal elections to be constitutional. The act (see.
29) contains the usual severability clause.
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taxes shall be used for educational purposes.29 A repeal statute of the poll
tax as it relates to voting qualifications would have as a legislative precedent that for nineteen years immediately after the adoption of the Tennessee constitution, Tennessee had no such qualification for voting.3,
Two courses of action conceivably are open to the advocates of the
abolition of the poll tax as a qualification for voting.3' The Tennessee constitution might be amended in accordance with Article XI, Section 3. The
possibility of success in this way seems most remoteY The more promising possibility would be to repeal the statutory requirement of the payment of the poll tax as a qualification for voting in primary and municipal
elections. There appears to be no constitutional obstacle to this procedure. 3 Although logically it might appear that different voters would
participate in the primaries and general elections or at least a different
majority would dominate each, in practice there would appear little likelihood that party regularity would so deteriorate that an "independent"
would defeat both party nominees in the general election.
Further there is nothing to prevent the removal of the poll tax as a
qualification for women to vote.34 A gynarchy would hardly result if this
were done. Might not the effect-whatever that might be-of complete
poll tax abolition be attained by repealing its requirement as a prerequisite for voting in municipal elections and primaries and by women in
all elections? 36
See, supra, note 24.
after the adoption of the present (1870) constitution the legislature exercised its
power under Art. IV, sec. i, and by Chapter io, Acts of the First Extraordinary Session, x870,
provided for the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting. This prerequisite was repealed by Chapter 124, Acts of 1871, and Chapter i, Acts of 1873. It was not until i8go that
payment of a poll tax was again a qualification for voting. See Chapter 26, Acts of First Extraordinary Session, i8go; cf. Chapter 222, Acts of i8gi. Throughout this period of nineteen
years, however, the poll tax was used as a revenue measure. See Chapter 26, Acts of First
Extraordinary Session, 1870.
31 These are in addition to the reduction of the amount of the poll tax to fifty cents per annum which, it is submitted, would be clearly constitutional, despite the eloquence of the court
concerning the constitution and the statute being welded into a permanent union.
32 See Combs, "An Unamended State Constitution: The Tennessee Constitution of 1870,"
32 American Political Science Review 514-24 (1938).
33 Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 122 Tenn. 570, 125 S.W. io36 (i9io).
29

30 Shortly

34 Biggs v. Beeler, supra, note i at 147-48.
3s Since this comment was written, attention has been called to the opinion written by
Chambliss, Justice, on a petition to rehear. But there is nothing in this opinion that requires a
modification in this comment.

